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Abstract Spontaneous helping behavior during an emergency
is influenced by the personality of the onlooker and by social
situational factors such as the presence of bystanders. Here, we
sought to determine the influences of sympathy, an other-
oriented response, and personal distress, a self-oriented re-
sponse, on the effect of bystanders during an emergency. In four
experiments, we investigated whether trait levels of sympathy
and personal distress predicted responses to an emergency in the
presence of bystanders by using behavioral measures and
single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation. Sympathy and
personal distress were expected to be associated with faster
responses to an emergency without bystanders present, but only
personal distress would predict slower responses to an emergen-
cy with bystanders present. The results of a cued reaction time
task showed that people who reported higher levels of personal
distress and sympathy responded faster to an emergency with-
out bystanders (Exp. 1). In contrast to our predictions, perspec-
tive taking but not personal distress was associated with slower
reaction times as the number of bystanders increased during an
emergency (Exp. 2). However, the decrease in motor
corticospinal excitability, a direct physiological measure of ac-
tion preparation, with the increase in the number of bystanders
was solely predicted by personal distress (Exp. 3). Incorporating
cognitive loadmanipulations during the observation of an emer-
gency suggested that personal distress is linked to an effect of
bystanders on reflexive responding to an emergency (Exp. 4).
Taken together, these results indicate that the presence of by-
standers during an emergency reduces action preparation in
people with a disposition to experience personal distress.
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When confronted with a person in distress, most people react
to the situation by rushing forward to help. Generally, two
types of emotional reactions to an emergency situation that
promote helping behavior are distinguished—namely, person-
al distress and sympathy (for a review, see Batson, Fultz, &
Schoenrade, 1987). Both state and trait levels of sympathy and
personal distress have been linked to helping behavior
(Archer, Diaz-Loving, Gollwitzer, Davis, & Foushee, 1981;
Carlo et al. 1999; Cialdini et al., 1987; Coke, Batson, &
McDavis, 1978; Eisenberg, Fabes, et al., 1989; Eisenberg &
Miller, 1987; Eisenberg, Miller, et al., 1989). However, sym-
pathy and personal distress markedly differ in terms of their
underlying motivations. The former results in altruistic-driven
(other-oriented; i.e., feelings of sympathy and compassion for
the victim) and the latter in egoistic-driven (self-oriented; i.e.,
feelings of distress and discomfort in the onlooker) helping
behavior (Batson et al., 1987; Batson, O’Quin, Fultz,
Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983; Davis, 1983).
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Although feelings of personal distress and sympathy each
lead to helping behavior, the underlying incentives to help
may thus be very different. As such, it could be argued that
social situation or context could have different influences on
these two factors. Indeed, studies have shown that helping
behavior driven by personal distress is reduced when the aver-
sive situation can be easily avoided, whereas sympathy-driven
helping behavior is not (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley,
& Birch, 1981; Batson et al. 1983; Coke et al., 1978; Toi &
Batson, 1982). Contextual effects have also been reported for
trait measures of other- and self-oriented responses to emer-
gency situations (Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-
Benefiel, 1986; Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer, & Speer,
1991; Romer, Gruder, & Lizzadro, 1986). Romer and
colleagues (1986) reported that people with an altruistic ori-
entation offered the most help when no compensation (exper-
imental credits) was given. Interestingly, helping was reduced
in this group when compensation was offered. Furthermore,
social evaluation of the latent helper by the experimenter in-
fluences the relation between personal distress and helping
behavior, but not between sympathy and helping behavior
(Archer et al., 1981; Eisenberg, Miller, et al., 1989; Fultz,
Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986). For exam-
ple, directly manipulated and self-reported concerns for social
evaluation did not account for the positive relation between
trait sympathy and helping behavior (Eisenberg, Miller, et al.,
1989). In sum, social context has a more pronounced and
negative influence on the relation between personal distress
and helping behavior than on helping behavior driven by
sympathy.
Helping behavior also decreases when more people are
present at the scene. This phenomenon is known as the by-
stander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968). Several cognition-
based explanations, including notions like the diffusion of
responsibility or pluralistic ignorance have been given for this
lack of helping behavior (Latané & Darley, 1970). The deci-
sion model proposed by Latané and Darley (1970) describes
the explicit cognitive calculation in terms of attentional cap-
ture, evaluation, responsibility, beliefs, and the conscious de-
cision to help. Interference can occur at any of these levels.
However, this model does not cover the entire range of expla-
nations (see, e.g., Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley,
2002) or the emerging view on helping behavior and prosocial
behavior (Preston, 2013; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Rand &
Nowak, 2013; Zaki, 2014). Helping behavior is observed
across species, ranging from rats (Ben-Ami Bartal, Decety,
& Mason, 2011; Ben-Ami Bartal, Rodgers, Bernardez
Sarria, Decety, & Mason, 2014; Márquez, Rennie, Costa, &
Moita, 2015; Sato, Tan, Tate, & Okada, 2015) to chimpanzees
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken, Hare, Melis,
Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007). The act of helping is not neces-
sarily a deliberate one. As was described by Preston (2013),
providing help is rooted in an evolutionarily conserved
mechanism, offspring care, with fixed action patterns (see
also Decety, Norman, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2012). This
bottom-up view highlights the importance of a neural mecha-
nism for fast, context-dependent, goal-directed responses.
Merely the observation of a salient situation—for example,
witnessing a person in distress—triggers a wide variety of
reflexive responses (Preston & de Waal, 2002), including in-
creased action readiness and preparation (e.g., fight–flight re-
sponses) (de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani,
2004; Frijda, 1986; Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014; Hajcak
et al., 2007; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993;
Schutter, Hofman, & van Honk, 2008).
In a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study, we investigated the neural basis of the bystander effect
by manipulating the number of bystanders present at an emer-
gency (Hortensius & de Gelder, 2014). The results showed
that activity decreased in the left precentral and postcentral
gyrus and medial frontal gyrus with an increase in the number
of bystanders when participants witnessed an emergency. This
suggests that the number of bystanders influences neural re-
sponses in brain regions dedicated to motor-related behavior,
possibly indicative of action preparation during the observa-
tion of an emergency (de Gelder et al., 2004; Hajcak et al.,
2007; Pichon et al. 2012; Schutter, Hofman, et al. 2008). An
outstanding question is how trait levels of sympathy and per-
sonal distress influence the effect of bystanders on action
preparation.
In the present study, we examined the extent to which trait
sympathy and personal distress predicted reaction times dur-
ing a cued reaction time task when participants witnessed an
emergency without bystanders (Exp. 1), and when the number
of bystanders was manipulated during an emergency (Exp. 2).
We hypothesized that both trait personal distress and sympa-
thy would predict faster responses to an emergency, as com-
pared with a nonemergency situation without bystanders
(Exp. 1). Furthermore, we expected that an increase in the
number of bystanders would result in slower responses to an
emergency situation. On the basis of the previously found
negative influence of social context (e.g., possibility to escape
the situation or exposure to social evaluation) on helping be-
havior driven by personal distress, we anticipated that this
slowing of reaction times with an increase in the number of
bystanders would be predicted by personal distress and not by
sympathy (Exp. 2).
Experiments 1 and 2
Method
Participants Sixty-two volunteers, between 18 and 29 years
of age, participated in exchange for course credits. In all, 18
female and 12male students took part in Experiment 1, and 21
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different female and 11 different male students took part in
Experiment 2. Right-handed (n= 56), left-handed (n= 5), and
ambidextrous (n = 1) participants were included. In
Experiment 2, the data from two participants were lost due
to technical failure and were replaced by new volunteers.
Participants were unaware of the aim of the study. Written
informed consent was obtained, and the experiment was
carried out in accordance with the standards set by the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli The stimuli used in Hortensius and de Gelder (2014)
were slightly modified for the present purpose. A simulation
of a street-side event was used as a starting point to create an
emergency situation in which a woman was shown fainting
and falling to the floor. During this emergency, people were
passing by (henceforth, the bystanders). The original short
video clips were recorded from the viewpoint of a person
looking across the street. The grayscale video clips were
blurred in order to reduce the visibility of facial expres-
sions and other nonrelevant information. In the present
experiment, we made several changes to the existing video
clips. First and foremost, besides the fainting and falling
scenario, we created a nonemergency situation in which
the woman stood up in a completely natural way. Using
Photoshop CS2 (Adobe Systems Inc., San Jose, CA, USA)
we overlaid the bystander sequence on both types of situ-
ations. This ensured that (a) the emergency and nonemer-
gency situations were similar in terms of bystanders, but
differed only in the action of the woman, and (b) the
actions of the woman were similar for all of the bystander
conditions. Both the increase in visual complexity between
the emergency and nonemergency situations and the emo-
tional impact of the woman’s actions with different num-
bers of bystanders were kept similar. To increase realism,
actions of the target character and bystanders happened
within the same time window. In total, six scenarios were
created, with the situation being either an emergency
(woman falling) or a nonemergency (woman standing up)
and the number of bystanders consisting of none, one, or
four bystanders. Six unique videos per scenario (three dif-
ferent actors and groups, with two repetitions) lasting 1 s
were created. See Fig. 1 and the supplemental online ma-
terials for examples of the stimuli used.
In addition, scrambled versions of the videos were made in
MATLAB (version R2011b; The MathWorks Inc., Natick,
MA, USA) using a Fourier-based transformation of each
phase spectrum of every video frame. This procedure removes
all social–emotional information except for low-level visual
parameters such as movement and spatial frequency. These
scrambled videos served as a low-level visual control
condition.
Task Tomeasure the effect of an emergency on reaction times,
an adapted cued reaction time task was used. In a cued reac-
tion time task, a preparation cue is presented before a response
cue, which allows the participants to prepare their response
(Hagura, Kanai, Orgs, & Haggard, 2012; van Boxtel &
Böcker, 2012). A video clip was presented in between the
onsets of the preparation cue and the go cue (Fig. 2).
Following a preparation cue (blue dot) at the onset of the video
clip, a go cue (green dot) was presented after 1 s—that is, the
offset of the video clip—to inform the participant to respond.
Both cues were presented for 160 ms. On 20 % of the trials in
Experiment 1, and 12.5 % of the trials in Experiment 2, a no-
go cue (red dot) was presented.
Importantly, the social situation might influence ongoing
emotional and cognitive processes that could be measured by
means of reaction times after the offset of the video. This
rationale was taken from other studies using emotional
Stroop tasks, gaze-cueing paradigms, and emotional go/no-
go tasks to map individual differences in processing emotional
and social information (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Nosek,
Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). The present setup allowed us to
assess responses to an emergency without explicit measures in
a relatively well-controlled environment, and reaction times
were taken as an index of action preparation during the
nonintentional observation of an emergency.
Questionnaire Empathy can be defined as a multifaceted
concept consisting of phenomena including mimicry, sympa-
thy, and perspective taking (Preston & de Waal, 2002). In line
with this multidimensional approach, we used the interperson-
al reactivity index (IRI) to measure trait empathy (Davis,
1980, 1983; De Corte et al., 2007). This questionnaire as-
sesses several different aspects of empathy. Besides perspec-
tive taking and fantasy (i.e., the ability to transpose oneself to
a fictional situation), the IRI measures empathic concern and
personal distress. The former trait measures sympathy and
compassion for less fortunate others (i.e., an other-oriented
emotional reaction), whereas the latter measures the experi-
ence of discomfort in response to distress in others (i.e., a self-
oriented emotional reaction). The difference between personal
distress and empathic concern becomes clear when one looks
at some of the example items to measure personal distress—
for instance, BI tend to lose control during emergencies^ and
BWhen I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency,
I go to pieces^—and empathic concern—for instance, BI often
have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than
me^ and BI am often quite touched by things that I see happen.^
In the literature, a variety of terms are used to describe an
other-oriented emotional response to the distress of another
person (Batson, 2009). Empathic concern and sympathy, the
most commonly used labels in the literature, are often used
interchangeably. The use of the term empathic concern might,
however, result in confusion, because it suggests that empathic
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concern and empathy are the same. Empathy refers to the mul-
tifaceted concept, whereas empathic concern is an aspect of this
concept (Wispé, 1986). In line with the existing literature, we
will use the term sympathy when referring to the trait measure
of an other-oriented emotional reaction.
Procedure The task and experimental procedure were iden-
tical for both experiments, unless otherwise specified. The
experimental session started with six practice trials of the
cued reaction time task, using video clips of a woman
standing and waiting. Next, participants completed a base-
line block with the scrambled versions of videos used in
the subsequent experimental blocks. In Experiment 1, only
the two scenarios without bystanders were used in the main
experimental blocks, whereas in Experiment 2, all six sce-
narios were used. No mention was made with respect to the
content of the movies. Original and mirrored videos were
included to prevent a possible influence of the direction of
movement in the videos (e.g., left motion direction) on the
subsequent response. The stimuli were presented in a ran-
domized order and repeated twice, resulting in 24 go trials
per condition. Participants were instructed to respond as
quickly as possible with the index finger of their dominant
hand and to fixate on the fixation cross shown continuous-
ly during the task. After the cued reaction time task, par-
ticipants completed the Dutch version of the IRI.
Fig. 1 Stills of the stimuli used in the study
Fig. 2 Cued reaction time task. Between a preparation cue and response cue, a video clip was shown. Participants responded as quickly as possible to the
go cue with the index finger of their dominant hand. ITI, intertrial interval
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Data reduction and analysis Reaction times <150 ms or >1,
500 ms were removed from analysis (mean± SD percentages
of trials removed: Exp. 1, 5.33 ± 1.43 %; Exp. 2, 3.12 ±
2.18 %), as well as incorrect trials (mean± SD percentages
of false alarms and misses: Exp. 1, 2.30± 2.48 %; Exp. 2,
2.27± 2.17 %). Reaction times were calculated as percentage
changes from the baseline (scrambled) block (set at 100 %).
In Experiment 1, a paired-sample t test was performed
to look at the difference in reaction times between emer-
gency and nonemergency situations. In addition, we
subtracted the baseline-corrected reaction times of the
nonemergency from those of the emergency trials to cal-
culate a bias score, so that negative values indicated faster
responses to the emergency situation. In Experiment 2, a
general linear model (GLM) for repeated measurements
with Situation (two levels) and Number of Bystanders
(three levels) as within-subjects factors was used to test
the difference in the influences of the number of by-
standers on baseline-corrected reaction times during the
observation of an emergency versus a nonemergency situ-
ation. Given the a priori predictions, we tested for a sig-
nificant linear trend contrast. Paired-samples t tests were
used for the post-hoc tests.
To investigate the relationship between trait personal
distress and sympathy and responses to an emergency, lin-
ear regression analyses were employed for both experi-
ments. In the first step, the hypothesized predictors were
entered into the model (for Exp. 1, trait personal distress
and sympathy; for Exp. 2, trait personal distress), whereas
in Step 2, the remaining scales were added in a stepwise
fashion (method: probability of F to enter, <.05;
criteria probability of F to remove, >.1). Cohen’s effect
size (ƒ2) was calculated using the formula ƒ2 = R2/(1 – R2),
with effect sizes of around 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 being
interpreted as small, medium, and large, respectively
(Cohen, 1988). The alpha level of significance was set
at .05 (two-tailed).
Results
Experiment 1 No difference in reaction times was found be-
tween emergency (mean± SEM percentage change from base-
line: 98.56± 1.19 %) and nonemergency (99.13± 1.18 %)
situations, t(29)= −0.44, p= .66. A significant linear regres-
sion model was observed for the emergency–nonemergency
bias score, F(2, 27) = 13.16, p< .001, R2 = .49, ƒ2 = 0.96
(Table 1). In line with our expectations, participants with
higher self-reported trait personal distress, β= −.35, p= .02,
and sympathy, β= −.54, p= .001, responded faster to an
emergency than to a nonemergency situation without by-
standers (Fig. 3).
Experiment 2 Table 2 shows the reaction times across con-
ditions. No main effect of situation, F(1, 29) = 3.69, p=
.07, or number of bystanders, F(2, 58) = 0.40, p= .67, was
observed. Contrary to expectations, no significant interac-
tion between situation and number of bystanders was
found, F(2, 58) = 1.43, p= .25. The linear trend for this
interaction was also not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.99, p=
.33, indicating that the linear effect of the number of by-
standers on reaction times did not vary as a function of the
situation. To determine whether trait personal distress pre-
dicted the effect of an increase in the number of bystanders
during an emergency situation, we calculated the regres-
sion slope of the reaction times as a function of the number
of bystanders in each situation (emergency and nonemer-
gency). This analysis was adapted from the perceptual-
processing literature, in which the slope of reaction times
is calculated as a function of set size (e.g., Golan, Bentin,
DeGutis, Robertson, & Harel, 2014; Lockhart et al., 2014;
Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). In the present study, the slope
indicated the change in reaction times with an increasing
number of bystanders in line with the previously used
parametric approach on group influences (Hortensius &
de Gelder, 2014), as well as the finding that the bystander
effect grows larger as the number of bystanders increases
(Fischer et al., 2011). If the number of bystanders had a
disruptive effect on the perception of and reaction to an
emergency, people would be slower when the number of
bystanders increased, and thus reaction times would in-
crease (positive slope). If, on the other hand, an increase
in the number of bystanders had no effect, reaction times
would not increase, and the slope would be zero. Finally, a
negative slope would indicate a decrease in reaction times:
People would respond faster when the number of by-
standers increased. Positive or negative slopes might be
indicative of a decreased or increased tendency for helping
behavior, respectively. The present findings showed a pos-
itive slope in both the emergency situation, mean ± SEM,
Table 1 Outcome of the regression analysis for emergency –
nonemergency bias scores in Experiment 1
b β p
Step 1
Overall model: F(2, 27) = 13.16, p< .001, R2 = .49, ƒ2 = 0.96
Constant 29.36 ± 5.95 [17.15, 41.57] <.001
Personal distress −0.67 ± 0.27 [−1.22, −0.12] –.35 .02
Sympathy −0.98 ± 0.25 [−1.50, −0.46] –.54 .001
Step 2
Perspective taking* .16 .29
Fantasy* .09 .58
b = unstandardized coefficients ± standard errors [95 % confidence inter-
vals], β= standardized coefficient. * Removed predictors
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0.48 ± 0.21, and the nonemergency situation, 0.17 ± 0.25.1
These slopes were not significantly different from each
other, t(28) = 1.17, p= .25. Although the nonemergency
slope did not differ from zero, t(28) = 0.67, p= .51, how-
ever, the emergency slope was significantly larger than
zero, t(28) = 2.33, p= .03.
A significant model was found for the emergency slope,
F(2, 26) = 4.18, p = .03, R2 = .24,ƒ2 = 0.32 (Table 3).
Although personal distress was positively associated with
the slowing of reaction times with an increase in the num-
ber of bystanders, β= .29, p= .11, it was neither a signifi-
cant nor the sole predictor in the model. The slope was
predicted by perspective taking, β = .46, p = .01.2
Interestingly, when responding to the emergency situation,
people with higher levels of trait perspective taking showed
a stronger effect of the number of bystanders. In other
words, people with a disposition to adopt the perspectives
of other people became slower when the number of by-
standers increased during an emergency. In line with expec-
tations, sympathy did not predict the influence of the num-
ber of bystanders, β= .11, p= .64. No significant model
was found for the nonemergency slope, F(1, 28) = 0.59,
p= .45, R2 = .02.
Discussion
Consistent with our predictions, trait personal distress and
sympathy were associated with faster responses to an
emergency situation without bystanders present (Exp. 1).
However, in contrast to our expectations, personal distress
did not significantly predict the effect of the number of by-
standers on reaction times during an emergency (Exp. 2).
Perspective taking predicted slower responses to an emergen-
cy situation with an increase in the number of bystanders. This
finding concurs with previous explanations of the bystander
effect that appeal to a more cognitive level, including the
diffusion of responsibility and pluralistic ignorance (Latané
& Darley, 1970). Work by Clark and Word (1972) showed
that the bystander effect is driven by ambiguity: Only during
ambiguous situations was helping behavior reduced by the
presence of bystanders. In the present experiment, the situa-
tion could be viewed as more ambiguous when more by-
standers were present. This bystander-induced ambiguity
may have resulted in an increased need to evaluate the situa-
tion, the state of the woman, and the behavior of the by-
standers, and especially so for people with higher levels of
trait perspective taking. The consequence of this was a slower
response to the emergency situation.
Was this slowing in response the result of a slower response
selection or increased top-down control of anticipatory re-
sponses? In the present cued reaction time task, the prepara-
tion cue displayed before a go cue allowed participants to
already prepare their response, and this could be influenced
by the presented situation (emergency or nonemergency situ-
ation). Faster reaction times might thus be indicative of in-
creased action preparation, whereas slower reaction times
might indicate a decrease in action preparation. Although in
1 One individual with a slope (−5.21) three standard deviations from the
mean in the emergency situation was removed from the analyses. With
inclusion of this individual, the slopes for the emergency (0.29 ± 0.28)
and nonemergency (0.11 ± 0.25) situations were not significantly differ-
ent from each other, t(29) = 0.63, p= .54, or from zero, t(29) = 1.06, p=
.30, and t(29) = 0.44, p= .66, respectively.
Table 2 Mean reaction times ± standard errors as percentage changes
from baseline for Experiment 2
No Bystanders One Bystander Four Bystanders
Emergency 86.34 ± 2.14 87.83 ± 2.13 87.86 ± 1.91
Nonemergency 89.21 ± 1.95 88.24 ± 1.80 89.34 ± 1.96
2 With inclusion of the outlier, a significant model appeared, F(2, 27) =
5.11, p= .01, R2 = .28, ƒ2 = 0.39, in which personal distress, β= .38, p=
.03, and perspective taking, β= .42, p= .02, predicted the emergency
slope.
Fig. 3 Trait personal distress and sympathy predicted faster responses to an emergency than to a nonemergency situation without bystanders
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a cued reaction time task like the one used here, reaction times
serve as a proxy for action preparation, the difficulty of using
reaction times is in distinguishing between the preparation and
execution of the response. Moreover, contextual effects on
reaction times can be driven by perceptual or action processes,
or by a combination of both. One way to overcome this issue
would be to directly target the human primary motor cortex by
means of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Using this
technique, a noninvasive magnetic pulse is delivered at the
surface of the scalp overlying the primary motor cortex. This
pulse results in a current flow in the cortex and produces a
motor-evoked potential (MEP). Motor corticospinal excitabil-
ity can be quantified by the MEP amplitude. Single-pulse
TMS to map motor corticospinal excitability levels when in-
dividuals observe a social cue has been used in studies of
action observation (Avenanti et al. 2013; Fadiga, Fogassi,
Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995), emotion (Hajcak et al., 2007;
Schutter, Hofman, et al. 2008), and empathy (Hétu et al.
2012). Importantly, increases in MEP amplitude has been pro-
posed to index action preparation (Coombes et al., 2009;
Hajcak et al., 2007; Schutter, Hofman, & van Honk, 2008;
van Loon, van den Wildenberg, van Stegeren, Hajcak, &
Ridderinkhof, 2010).
In the third experiment, we used single-pulse TMS to mea-
sure changes in motor corticospinal excitability levels, to fur-
ther substantiate the influence of personal distress. By probing
the primary motor cortex of healthy individuals, we aimed to
extend the previous experiments by directly quantifying
changes in the motor system as a function of the number of
bystanders during an emergency situation. TMS studies have
shown that when confronted with pain in another individual,
both state and trait measures of personal distress increase,
rather than decrease, motor corticospinal excitability in the
onlooker (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Sforza, & Aglioti,
2009). Moreover, trait personal distress has been positively
correlated with higher motor corticospinal excitability levels
in response to viewing negatively valenced pictures
(Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2014). These results
suggest that a disposition to experience distress can have a
direct influence on perception and action. Indeed, a recent
study using kinematics showed that trait personal distress pre-
dicted reduced motor control in participants who were
confronted with another person’s negative emotions (Ferri
et al., 2010). In line with these findings, we expected that
the linear decrease in motor corticospinal excitability levels
as a function of increasing number of bystanders during an
emergency would be predicted by personal distress.
Interestingly, previous studies have observed a relationship
between trait levels of perspective taking and motor
corticospinal excitability levels (Avenanti et al., 2009;
Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Borgomaneri, Gazzola, et al.
2015). These findings were opposite the pattern found for
personal distress and were interpreted as stimulation of the
(action) state of the observed individual and not as action
preparation. Although we did not foresee an effect of perspec-
tive taking, these observations suggest that if perspective tak-
ing were predictive of the influence of bystanders on
responding to an emergency, this effect would be opposite
the pattern found for personal distress.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants Twenty-three right-handed volunteers (19 wom-
en, four men), between 19 and 27 years of age, participated in
the experiment in exchange for course credits or payment.
Participants were screened for contraindications for noninva-
sive brain stimulation (Keel, Smith, & Wassermann, 2001).
None of the volunteers had a history of psychiatric or neuro-
logical disease, and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion. The participants were naïve to the aim of the study, and
written informed consent was obtained. The study was ap-
proved by the medical ethics committee of the University
Medical Center Utrecht and of Utrecht University, Utrecht,
The Netherlands. The stimulation parameters were in agree-
ment with the International Federation of Clinical
Neurophysiology safety guidelines (Rossi, Hallett, Rossini,
Pascual-Leone, & the Safety of TMS Consensus Group,
2009) and in accordance with the standards set by the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation A biphasic magnetic
brain stimulator (maximum output 4,160 A peak/1,750 VAC
peak) with a modified 8-shaped iron core coil (Neopulse,
Atlanta, GA, USA) was used for stimulation over the left M1.
Table 3 Outcome of the regression analysis of emergency slopes in
Experiment 2
b β p
Step 1
Overall model: F(1, 27) = 1.19, p= .29, R2 = .04
Constant −0.19± 0.65 [−1.52, 1.15] .78
Personal distress 0.34 ± 0.31[−0.30, 0.98] .21 .29
Step 2
Overall model: F(2, 26) = 4.18, p= .03, R2 = .24, ƒ2 = 0.32
Constant −3.07± 1.24 [−5.62, −0.51] .02
Personal distress 0.48 ± 0.29 [−0.11, 1.07] .29 .11
Perspective taking 0.96 ± 0.36 [0.21, 1.71] .46 .01
Sympathy* .11 .64
Fantasy* –.006 .98
b= unstandardized coefficients ± standard errors [95 % confidence inter-
vals], β= standardized coefficient. * Removed predictors.
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Motor-evoked potentials MEPs were recorded with active
Ag–AgCl electrodes (11 × 17 mm) using an ActiveTwo sys-
tem (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) from the right
abductor pollicis brevis (APB) in a belly–tendon montage,
with the active electrode placed at the muscle belly of the right
APB and the reference electrode located at the proximal pha-
lanx of the thumb (Baumgartner, Willi, & Jäncke, 2007;
Hajcak et al. 2007; Schutter, Hofman, et al. 2008). The ground
(CMS-DRL) electrode was attached to the wrist. The sam-
pling rate was set at 2048 Hz, and the signal was high-pass
filtered offline (3-dB cutoff frequency: 20 Hz, roll-off 24 dB/
octave).
Procedure Upon arrival at the laboratory, the experimenter
explained the procedure, and participants provided written
informed consent and answered several questions on their
current physical and mental well-being. Participants were
seated in a comfortable dentist chair, with their arms placed
on the upper leg and the palm of the hand facing upward. The
resting motor threshold (MT) of the left hemisphere was
assessed by means of the standardized visual thumb move-
ment procedure (Schutter & van Honk, 2006). During the
task, the TMS intensity was set at 120 % MT. Participants
were instructed to relax their body and not to focus on their
hands, but to fixate on the fixation cross shown continuously
during the task. Participants did not need to respond during
stimulus presentation. The same stimuli as in Experiment 2
were presented in a random order, with a blank screen with a
fixation cross (4,800–5,200 ms) in between. Thus, six condi-
tions were used, with the Situation (emergency vs. nonemer-
gency) and the Number of Bystanders (no, one, or four by-
standers) as within-subjects factors. As in the previous two
experiments, no mention was made with respect to the content
of the movies. The TMS pulse was pseudorandomly delivered
between 800 and 1,000 ms (in six steps of 40 ms) after stim-
ulus onset. This procedure is commonly used in single-pulse
TMS studies to prevent anticipation by the participants (e.g.,
Avenanti et al. 2005). In the present study, the timing of the
pulse did not affectMEP amplitudes, as was shown by a GLM
for repeated measurements with Timing of Pulse (six levels)
as a within-subjects factors, F(5, 100)= 0.82, p= .51. See
Fig. 4 for the TMS procedure. As in Experiments 1 and 2,
the procedure started with three practice trials (woman stand-
ing and waiting), followed by the scrambled videos of the
scenarios serving as the baseline (12 trials), and finally, ran-
dom presentation of the six scenarios (12 trials per condition).
As in the previous two experiments, participants completed
the IRI at the end of the experiment. Upon completion, par-
ticipants were debriefed and received payment.
Data analysis The data from one participant were removed
because of a noisy and unstable electromyography (EMG)
signal, and the data from a second participant were removed
because of failure to comply with the instructions (i.e., exces-
sive movement during testing). The MEP was quantified as
the peak-to-peak amplitude of the maximal EMG response.
Every trial was visually inspected, which was done blind to
the stimulus condition. Trials containing excessive back-
ground EMG and abnormal MEPs were removed. The mean
± SD percentage of trials removed across participants was
4.37± 4.15 %. MEP amplitudes were calculated as the per-
centage change from the MEP amplitude during the baseline
(scrambled) block.
For the statistical analyses, a procedure similar to that de-
scribed in Experiment 2 was followed. First, to test the influ-
ence of the number of bystanders on MEP amplitudes during
the observation of an emergency versus a nonemergency, a
GLM for repeated measurements with Situation (two levels)
and Number of Bystanders (three levels) as within-subjects
factors was used.
Next, we calculated the slopes of the MEP amplitudes with
the increase in the number of bystanders for the emergency
and nonemergency situations for each individual. A negative
slope would indicate that the MEP amplitude decreased as a
function of the number of bystanders. A decrease in MEP
amplitude would reflect a decrease in action preparation, and
an increase in amplitude would reflect an increase in action
Fig. 4 Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) task. Motor-evoked poten-
tials (MEPs) were recorded to a TMS pulse that was pseudorandomly deliv-
ered between 800 and 1,000 ms after video clip onset. ITI, intertrial interval
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preparation. To examine the relation between trait personal
distress and the effect of the number of bystanders on MEP
amplitudes, a linear regression analysis was employed similar
to the one in Experiment 2. Trait personal distress was entered
in the first step, and in Step 2 the three other trait empathy
scores were added to the model in a stepwise fashion. The trait
empathy scores of one participant were missing, resulting in a
sample of 20 participants for the regression analyses.
Results
TMS was well tolerated, and no adverse events occurred.
Table 4 shows the MEP amplitudes across conditions. No
main effect of situation, F(1, 20) = 0.97, p= .34, or number
of bystanders, F(2, 40) = 0.54, p= .59, nor an interaction
between situation and number of bystanders, F(2, 40) =
0.30, p= .74, was found. Additionally, we tested whether trait
personal distress predicted the effect of the increase in the
number of bystanders on motor corticospinal excitability
levels during an emergency. A significant linear regression
model was observed for the emergency slope, F(1, 17) =
5.42, p= .03, R2 = .24, ƒ2 = 0.32 (Table 5). In line with expec-
tations, personal distress was negatively related to the effect of
the number of bystanders on motor corticospinal excitability
levels during an emergency, β= −.49, p= .03.3 No significant
model emerged for the nonemergency slope, F(1, 19) = 0.77,
p= .39, R2= .04.
Discussion
In the third experiment, we examined the effect of the number
of bystanders during an emergency situation on a direct mea-
sure of the motor system by using single-pulse TMS. No lin-
ear decrease in motor corticospinal excitability levels was ob-
served with an increasing number of bystanders when partic-
ipants witnessed an emergency. In line with our expectations,
people with higher levels of personal distress showed a stron-
ger decrease in motor corticospinal excitability levels during
the observation of an emergency when the number of by-
standers increased.
In the previous two experiments, we observed that both
personal distress and perspective taking were associated with
the effect of the number of bystanders on responding to an
emergency. Using a direct measure of the physiological state
of the motor system, we found that only personal distress, and
not sympathy or perspective taking, predicted the effect of the
number of bystanders. These results suggest that the effect of
bystanders on the initial response to an emergency may indeed
be related to action preparation (Hortensius & de Gelder,
2014). To further quantify this relation between personal dis-
tress and the effect of bystanders, and to disentangle the influ-
ences of perspective taking and personal distress on action
preparation, we studied the influences of automaticity and
cognitive involvement on these processes in a final
experiment.
Several studies have started to explore whether reactions to
distressful events are automatic (e.g., Gu & Han, 2007;
Morelli & Lieberman, 2013; Rameson, Morelli, &
Lieberman, 2012; Yamada & Decety, 2009). For example,
Rand and Epstein (2014) showed that the decision-making
process for extreme altruistic acts can be described as fast,
intuitive, and reflexive. Of course, it is not an all-or-nothing
mechanism. Some aspects of an empathic reaction can be
automatic and reflexive, while others are deliberate and
reflective in nature. Fan and Han (2008) showed that late,
but not early, components are influenced by task manipula-
tions. Moreover, interindividual differences in terms of auto-
maticity and the attentional malleability of empathic responses
have been reported (Rameson et al., 2012). Individuals with
higher levels of trait empathy showed no reduction in empath-
ic responses when performing an unrelated task, suggesting a
more automatic process underlying these responses in these
individuals. However, this study did not look at different as-
pects of empathy.
Although sympathy and personal distress are both consid-
ered to be part of a larger affective empathy cluster, they differ
in terms of cognitive involvement. Whereas conditioning, di-
rect association, and simple labeling or categorization of the
Table 4 Mean motor-evoked potential amplitudes ± standard errors, as
percentage changes from baseline for Experiment 3
No Bystanders One Bystander Four Bystanders
Emergency 133.94± 14.06 142.39 ± 14.72 140.18 ± 14.33
Nonemergency 133.32± 11.68 133.35 ± 14.55 134.74 ± 14.47
Table 5 Outcome of the regression analysis of the emergency slopes in
Experiment 3
b β p
Step 1
Overall model: F(1, 17) = 5.42, p= .03, R2 = .24, ƒ2 = 0.32
Constant 14.22 ± 5.69 [2.22, 26.22] .02
Personal distress −1.32± 0.57 [−2.52, −0.12] –.49 .03
Step 2
Sympathy* –.15 .54
Perspective taking* .18 .42
Fantasy* .25 .26
b = unstandardized coefficients ± standard errors [95 % confidence inter-
vals], β= standardized coefficient. * Removed predictors
3 As in Experiments 1 and 2, we checked for outliers. In line with Cook
and Weisberg (1982), we removed one individual with a Cook’s distance
of 1.39. With this individual included, a similar, but weaker, model
emerged, F(1, 18) = 3.72, p= .07, R2 = .17, ƒ2 = 0.20, in which personal
distress predicted the emergency slope, β= −.41, p = .07.
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emergency can lead to personal distress, they do not lead to
feelings of sympathy per se (Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, &
Knight, 2014). Personal distress also requires minimal cogni-
tive processes (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg et al.
2014), whereas sympathy requires more elaborate or more
complex cognitive processes. Similarly, perspective taking—
the capacity to understand the thoughts and feelings of another
individual (Davis, 1980)—requires more sophisticated, top-
down processes (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996).
This dissociation between personal distress, on the one hand,
and sympathy and perspective taking, on the other hand, is
also reflected in relations with prefrontal functions (Spinella,
2005). Trait personal distress is related to more executive dys-
function, whereas perspective taking and sympathy are in-
versely related to executive dysfunction.
One possible way to disentangle the influences and needs
for cognitive processes in personal distress, sympathy, and
perspective taking, and the possible automaticity of these re-
actions, would be to use a cognitive load manipulation. By
imposing a cognitive load during the occurrence of another
task, the dynamics between cognitive processes and the be-
havior of interest can be established. Under low-load condi-
tions, the cognitive system is accessible and can influence
behavior. This behavior can be described as being reflective,
deliberate, or explicit. Under high-load conditions, the cogni-
tive system is engaged and relatively inaccessible. If a partic-
ular behavior occurs during a high-cognitive-load manipula-
tion, it is indicative of an automatic or reflexive mechanism
(Gilbert, Pelham, &Krull, 1988), since these processes are not
dependent on cognition.
By using a cognitive load manipulation during the cued
reaction time task, we aimed to extend the previous findings
and to dissociate the influences of trait perspective taking and
personal distress on the negative influence of bystanders.
Given the foregoing, we hypothesized that under conditions
of high cognitive load, only trait personal distress would pre-
dict the slowing of reaction times during an emergency with
bystanders present. If trait perspective taking were related to
the effect of bystanders, this would only be apparent under
conditions of low cognitive load. In line with the previous
findings, we expected that sympathy would not predict the
effect of bystanders during the observation of an emergency
under either low- or the high-cognitive-load conditions.
Experiment 4
Method
Participants A group of 39 female and 11 male volunteers
(43 right-handed, six left-handed, one ambidextrous), between
18 and 28 years of age, participated in exchange for course
credits. The participants were naïve to the aim of the study and
provided informed consent. The experiment was carried out in
accordance with the standards set by the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Task and procedure The cued reaction time task was
slightly adapted to allow a cognitive load manipulation.
Participants were instructed to remember a single two-digit
number (e.g., 12; low cognitive load) or a combination of
three two-digit numbers (e.g., 24, 36, 87; high cognitive load)
while performing the cued reaction time task. Before each
block of the task, a screen with a load instruction was present-
ed to the participant for 2,500 ms. This was followed by a
block of eight reaction time trials with 25 % no-go trials.
After each block a memory probe was shown, and participants
were instructed to indicate which of the two numbers had been
part of the original sequence.
At the start of the experimental session, participants first
practiced the cued reaction time task in isolation (three
trials), followed by two practice blocks with the cognitive
load manipulation (one low- and one high-cognitive-load
block, each with three reaction time trials). Participants
were instructed to remember the number presented at the
start of each block while simultaneously performing the
task. For the practice trials, video clips of a woman stand-
ing and waiting were used, whereas for the main experi-
mental blocks, only the emergency and nonemergency sce-
narios with no and four bystanders were used. In the first
half of the experiment, only the emergency and nonemer-
gency situations with no bystanders were shown, followed
by the emergency and nonemergency situations with by-
standers present. This was done in order to measure the
initial response to an emergency first without bystanders,
and subsequently to assess the impact of bystanders on the
response to an emergency, without trial-to-trial fluctuations
and across-trial influence (cf. Rameson et al., 2012). The
cognitive load manipulation was presented in a random-
ized order throughout the experiment, whereas the emer-
gency and nonemergency situations were presented in a
randomized order within each block. Participants per-
formed 32 blocks in total, resulting in 24 go trials per
condition. After the cued reaction time task, participants
completed the Dutch version of the IRI.
Data analysis The cognitive load manipulation was success-
ful, so that accuracy decreased in the high-cognitive-load con-
dition (mean± SD percentage correct: 86.50± 11.11 %) as
compared to the low-cognitive-load condition (92.13 ±
11.97 %), t(49) = 3.41, p= .001, d= 0.48. Filtering of the
reaction times was performed as in Experiments 1 and 2
(mean ± SD percentage of trials removed, 0.63 ± 0.96 %;
mean ± SD percentage of false alarms and misses, 2.94 ±
2.26 %). To calculate a bias score, we subtracted the reaction
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2016) 16:672–688 681
times for the situations with bystanders present from the reac-
tion times for situations with no bystanders present, individu-
ally for the emergency and nonemergency situations in both
the low- and high-cognitive-load conditions. Negative values
indicated slower responses to the situation with bystanders
present, and thus a stronger bystander effect, whereas pos-
itive values indicated faster responses to the situations with
bystanders present. Next, we corrected for general task
effects by performing a regression that predicted the bias
scores in each of the four conditions based on the task
effect (accuracy low – high cognitive load). By using the
standardized residual of each of the bias scores, the vari-
ance explained by the overall task performance was re-
moved, and the unique contributions of each condition
could be examined. Next, linear regression analyses were
used to predict the bias scores for the emergency and non-
emergency situations under conditions of low and high
cognitive load. As with the previous experiments, in the
first step the hypothesized predictors were entered into the
model (with low cognitive load, trait perspective taking;
with high cognitive load, trait personal distress), and the
remaining scales were added in Step 2 (in a stepwise
fashion).
Results
In the low-cognitive-load condition, no significant linear re-
gression model was found for the emergency, F(1, 48)= 0.98,
p= .33, R2 = .02, or the nonemergency, F(2, 47)= 2.58, p=
.09, R2= .10, situation. In the high-cognitive-load condition, a
significant linear regression model was observed for the emer-
gency situation, F(1, 48) = 6.02, p= .02, R2= .11, ƒ2= 0.12
(Table 6), but not for the nonemergency situation, F(1, 48) =
1.53, p= .22, R2 = .03. Crucially, trait personal distress pre-
dicted a stronger slowing of responses to an emergency situ-
ation with bystanders than with no bystanders present, β=
−.33, p= .02 (Fig. 5). Neither sympathy nor perspective taking
predicted the effect of bystanders: β= −.12, p= .44, and β=
.09, p= .52, respectively.
Discussion
In our final experiment, we used the cued reaction time
task combined with a cognitive load manipulation to influ-
ence cognitive involvement during the observation of an
emergency with bystanders present. In agreement with our
expectations, the results showed that personal distress pre-
dicted the slowing of responses to an emergency with by-
standers present during the high-cognitive-load condition.
In other words, people with higher levels of personal dis-
tress demonstrated stronger response slowing to an emer-
gency with bystanders present when cognitive involvement
was restricted. Under conditions of low cognitive load, and
thus without cognitive restriction, neither personal distress
nor perspective taking predicted an effect of bystanders on
responding to an emergency. Sympathy was not associated
with an effect of bystanders on responses to an emergency
in either the presence or the absence of cognitive restric-
tion. The results of Experiment 3 indicated that personal
distress is predictive of a mechanism related to action prep-
aration, and the results of Experiment 4 extended these
findings in an important manner. Personal distress predict-
ed an effect of bystanders on an initial response to an
emergency that was more related to automatic, reflexive
action preparation.
Table 6 Outcome of the regression analysis for the no bystander –
bystander bias scores in the emergency situation with high cognitive
load in Experiment 4
B β p
Step 1
Overall model: F(1, 48) = 6.02, p= .02, R2 = .11, ƒ2 = 0.12
Constant 0.99 ± 0.42 [0.14, 1.84] .02
Personal distress −0.53± 0.22 [−0.97, −0.10] –.33 .02
Step 2
Sympathy* –.12 .44
Perspective taking* .09 .52
Fantasy* –.22 .14
b= unstandardized coefficients ± standard errors [95 % confidence inter-
vals], β= standardized coefficient. * Removed predictors.
Fig. 5 Under high cognitive load, trait personal distress predicted the
slowing of responses when bystanders were present during an emergency
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General discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate the influence
of bystanders on the responses of individuals to an emergency
situation by integrating situational and dispositional factors. In
a series of four experiments, we examined the differential
effects of trait sympathy and personal distress on the willing-
ness to help with bystanders present. The results showed that
even though personal distress and sympathy predicted overall
faster responses to an emergency when no bystanders were
present, personal distress was most consistently predictive of a
decrease in action preparation when bystanders were present
during an emergency. These results are in line with findings
showing differences between other-oriented and self-centered
responses to emergency situations in terms of sensitivity to
social context. Our observations show that the effect of by-
standers is already present at the level of action preparation.
This bystander effect is proposed to be stronger for people
with a predisposition to experience self-centered empathic re-
sponses, as measured by trait personal distress.
Our findings add to the growing body of evidence on how
empathic responses are modulated by situational and disposi-
tional factors (Decety & Lamm, 2009), as well as how sym-
pathy and personal distress differ in sensitivity to social con-
text (Archer et al. 1981; Batson et al., 1981; Batson et al.,
1987; Batson et al., 1983; Carlo et al., 1991; Coke et al.
1978; Eisenberg, Fabes, et al., 1989; Fultz et al. 1986;
Romer et al., 1986; Toi & Batson, 1982). Decety and
Jackson (2004) argued that three interrelated mechanisms un-
derlie the variety of empathic responses; perception–action
coupling (see also Preston & de Waal, 2002), emotion regula-
tion mechanisms, and perspective taking. Since trait personal
distress as well as sympathy measure affective responses to
the distress of others (Davis, 1983), one possibility is that a
disposition to experience and regulate negative emotions un-
derlies this difference in sensitivity to social context. Studies
have shown a positive relation between a disposition to expe-
rience personal distress and heightened behavioral and phys-
iological responses to social–emotional situations and de-
creased regulation of these responses (Avenanti et al. 2009;
Borgomaneri et al. 2014; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg
et al. 1994; Ferri et al. 2010; Okun, Shepard, & Eisenberg,
2000). In contrast, trait levels of sympathy have been linked to
increased emotion regulation (Eisenberg et al. 1996; Okun
et al., 2000). Using single-pulse TMS, we showed that per-
sonal distress but not sympathy predicts the negative influence
of bystanders on motor corticospinal excitability levels as
indexed by MEPs. In line with previous studies (Avenanti et
al. 2009; Borgomaneri et al. 2014; Ferri et al. 2010), these
results suggest that a distinction between sympathy and per-
sonal distress can be observed already in the action domain. A
disposition to experience personal distress in contrast to sym-
pathy thus can not only lead to an imbalance in higher,
regulatory-related processes, but may already have an influ-
ence on a lower, action-related processes. Although the de-
fault mode is to help—that is, intact coupling between situa-
tion and response—the presence of bystanders may result in a
decoupling. This effect may be stronger in people with higher
levels of personal distress, who display attenuated action prep-
aration to respond to the emergency situation in the presence
of bystanders.
What could drive this decoupling? The perception–action
arc is motivation-dependent (Carver, 2006; Mogenson, Jones,
& Yim, 1980). The state of the motor cortex (Schutter, de
Weijer, Meuwese, Morgan, & van Honk, 2008; Schutter,
Hofman, Hoppenbrouwers, & Kenemans, 2011) and the mul-
tifaceted concept of empathy (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012;
Tullett, Harmon-Jones, & Inzlicht, 2012; Zaki, 2014) have
been linked to both approach- and avoidance-related motiva-
tion. As was described by Preston (2013), the distinction be-
tween avoidance and approach is crucial in explaining the lack
of helping behavior in some situations. For onlookers to re-
spond to an emergency, the event has to be classified as a
threat, which consequently triggers either approach- or
avoidance-related behavior. Several explicit or implicit strate-
gies can result in the approach toward or avoidance of current
or future empathic responses (Zaki, 2014). For example, the
avoidance can be overt (need to escape the situation) or covert
(attentional disengagement). Graziano and Tobin (2009) de-
scribed the approach–avoidance dimension of an emergency
situation. They suggested that two evolutionarily conserved
motivational systems, fight-or-flight, which includes freezing
behavior (the fight–freeze–flight system; e.g., McNaughton &
Corr, 2004), and parental care, are activated when we encoun-
ter a novel or distressful event, and these two systems act as
opponents to each other’s dominant action patterns.
Incorporating the opponent-process model of motivation by
Solomon and colleagues (Solomon, 1980; Solomon & Corbit,
1974), the authors stated that the first, and fastest, response to
an emergency is that of distress (Process A, fight–freeze–
flight system), and if the possibility to escape the situation is
available and easy, helping behavior does not occur. However,
over time the slower reaction of sympathy (Process B, care
system) is activated, opposing the fixed action patterns of
personal distress (Graziano & Habashi, 2010; Graziano &
Tobin, 2009). This nicely fits the observation in the first
experiment that, although sympathy and personal dis-
tress are opposing constructs, they both predicted faster
responses to an emergency without bystanders present,
and also the notion in the literature that they are posi-
tively correlated and can exist in parallel within an in-
dividual (Batson et al., 1987; Davis, 1980). However,
the presence of bystanders during an emergency possi-
bly increases Process A (distress, the fight–freeze–flight
system), leading to heightened distress and mitigating
preparation of helping behavior, whereas Process B
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(sympathy, care system) is not affected by the presence of
bystanders. This bystander-mediated increase in distress in the
onlooker and increased activation of the fight–freeze–flight
system is only apparent in people with a disposition to expe-
rience personal distress. However, it remains unknown wheth-
er and how this increase in state levels of distress occurs and
what the dynamics of a personal distress state–trait interaction
would be.
It is possible that the observed effect might not be related to
a decrease in action preparation or inhibition of approach, but
rather to a freeze-like response. This amounts to a reduction in
motor corticospinal excitability with an increase in the number
of bystanders during an emergency. Thus, this reductionmight
reflect increased freezing in people with a disposition to ex-
perience personal distress. Freezing occurs when there is no
possibility to escape the situation (or predator), or as an initial
phase in a response (McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Several
arguments complicate the interpretation of the decrease in
motor corticospinal excitability as a freezing motor plan.
First, a freeze-like reduction inmotor corticospinal excitability
has been recorded 100–125 ms post-stimulus-onset
(Borgomaneri, Vitale, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2015). In the
present study, we stimulated in a time window from 800 to
1,000 ms post-stimulus-onset, making it unlikely that we
tapped into a freeze-like motor program. Second, both state
and trait levels of personal distress are related to enhanced
motor corticospinal excitability to stimuli that are negative in
valence, which is contrary to a freeze-related reduction in
excitability levels (Avenanti et al., 2009; Borgomaneri et al.
2014). Third, we measured MEPs from an extensor muscle,
the APB. Although the link between extensor and flexor mus-
cles and approach and avoidance motivation is complicated
(Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2013; Phaf, Mohr, Rotteveel, &
Wicherts, 2014), recordings of APB and other muscles have
been linked to approach motivation (Coombes et al., 2009;
Schutter, Hofman, & van Honk, 2008). To shed more light
on the issues of approach and avoidance motives, future stud-
ies may incorporate different TMS procedures that could al-
low the measurement of inhibitory processes, recordings from
multiple muscle groups at several time periods, and more di-
rect measures of freezing, motivation, and prosocial behavior,
to disentangle these different processes. In addition, future
research could use different situations (e.g., a person directly
being threatened by another individual with bystanders pres-
ent) to shed light on the motives in the onlooker.
Helping behavior is thought to be driven by an evolution-
arily conserved mechanism, reflexive in nature (Preston,
2013) and shared with other species (Preston & de Waal,
2002), that is the end result of both bottom-up and top-down
processes. This is not to say that the decoupling is a deliberate,
cognition-driven process. In the final experiment, personal
distress predicted the effect of bystanders on responding to
an emergency under conditions of high cognitive load. This
suggests that the bystander effect is apparent not only at an
explicit, cognitive level, but also at an implicit, automatic,
action-related one. The perception–reaction arc can be auto-
matic but still be context-dependent (Gawronski & Cesario,
2013). Although some research has suggested that the percep-
tion of the need of others is not automatic (e.g., Gu & Han,
2007; Rameson et al., 2012), it is important to note that most
studies have focused on the perception of the need and distress
of others. In the present study, we highlighted the reactive
aspect by measuring reaction times and motor corticospinal
excitability to the distress of others. In contrast with other
studies that have tended to be biased toward explicit cognitive
processes (intention or mental states), we focused on percep-
tion–action coupling as a function of context.
In the second experiment, we observed that perspective
taking and not personal distress predicted the negative effect
of bystanders on responding to an emergency. What is the role
of perspective taking? How does this relate to the effect of
personal distress and the two-system perspective? Multiple
mechanisms can exist in parallel to influence responses to,
and helping behavior during, an emergency situation with
bystanders. The prosocial individual is the combined sum of
situation-dependent cognition (e,g, perspective taking), feel-
ings (e.g., personal distress or sympathy), and behavior
(Habashi & Graziano, 2015). Of course, these components
interact, and perspective taking can lead to an increase in state
sympathy (Batson et al. 1989; Batson et al. 1988; Toi &
Batson, 1982). For example, instructing participants to take
the perspective of rather than simply to observe the victim
increases sympathy, whereas personal distress remains un-
changed (Toi & Batson, 1982). These interactions are also
found for trait levels: Perspective taking is positively correlat-
ed with sympathy, but inversely correlated with personal dis-
tress (Davis, 1980; De Corte et al., 2007). One hypothesis that
partly reconciles the results is that perspective taking, by
means of its interaction with sympathy, is related to Process
B (sympathy and the care system). Although Process B is not
influenced directly by the presence of bystanders, it is influ-
enced indirectly, by means of perspective taking, which thus
sustains a form of cognitive influence on Process B. Together,
situational influences on both Processes A and B might be
mediated by trait levels of personal distress and perspective
taking, respectively. How the slowing of responses, as predict-
ed by perspective taking, is related to helping behavior re-
mains to be investigated.
The majority of participants were female college stu-
dents, and the question arises whether the present findings
can be generalized to the population at large. Popular belief
holds that women score higher on empathy-related con-
structs, but that men are more likely to provide help. So
far, no consistent sex differences in helping behavior have
been reported (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). In a recent meta-
analysis based on all studies of the bystander effect
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between 1960 and 2010, no significant sex difference was
found (Fischer et al., 2011). Importantly, Tice and
Baumeister (1985) showed that sex or the level of feminin-
ity did not influence the occurrence of helping behavior
when bystanders were present. Only participants high in
masculinity provided less help. It has been argued that
sex differences in helping behavior (and other empathy-
related processes) are all about gender roles (Eagly &
Crowley, 1986; Senneker & Hendrick, 1983). These differ-
ences only emerge when gender roles are primed by means
of the social context, such as by demand characteristics or
the type of helping behavior studied, and are motivation-
dependent (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Ickes, Gesn, &
Graham, 2000; Klein & Hodges, 2001). Although sex dif-
ferences or the impact of gender roles on the processing of
an emergency and helping behavior were not part of our
primary research question, they may be of interest for fu-
ture research.
Another issue with both methodological and theoretical
consequences that could be addressed in future research is
the effect of repetition on responses to emergency situations
with or without bystanders. Of course, a certain number of
trials will be necessary to achieve a reliable measure of reac-
tion times, but it might also have several important conse-
quences. Reaction times might change as a function of repe-
tition number. Although effects of repetition on stimulus–re-
sponse relationships have been studied (Bertelson, 1965;
Felfoldy, 1974), the interactions with stimulus condition and
personality characteristics remain unknown. How do multiple
repetitions of an emergency situation interact with a disposi-
tion to experience personal distress? On the basis of applica-
tion of the model described by Graziano and Tobin (2009) to
the present data, repetition could have differential effects on
Process A (distress and the fight–freeze–flight system) and
Process B (sympathy and the care system). One hypothesis
conceptually driven by the work of Solomon and colleagues
(Solomon, 1980; Solomon & Corbit, 1974) suggests that with
increased repetition or exposure to emergencies, the domi-
nance of Process A diminishes, whereas Process B increases
in strength (Graziano & Habashi, 2010). This would then
result in a decrease in distress-driven processes and an
increase in sympathy-driven processes. In the present con-
text, one would thus expect that with an increase in rep-
etition, personal distress would eventually not be predic-
tive of the negative effect of bystanders on responding to
an emergency. However, repetition effects can take multi-
ple forms and shapes (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin,
2006), and the interactions with stimulus condition and
dispositional factors need to be investigated in carefully
designed experiments.
In conclusion, using a person–situation approach, we have
extended the existing literature on the psychological and neu-
ral bases of the bystander effect by showing that the presence
of bystanders during an emergency attenuates action prepara-
tion for people with higher levels of trait personal distress—
that is, with a disposition to experience self-centered empathic
responses.
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